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What are we? Philosophers often look for answers 
that capture what we are fundamentally—what 
makes us who we are. 
Maybe we’re non-physical souls or minds.[1] Maybe 
we’re our thoughts and our memories. Or, perhaps 
we’re physical things like bodies or brains. 
According to a view called animalism, we’re human 
animals.[2] This view is the focus of our discussion 
here. 
1. Animalism 
Animalism is the view that each of us is a human 
animal: a biological organism of the species Homo 
sapiens. Animalists acknowledge that human animals 
typically exhibit rationality and levels of intelligence 
that other animals don’t, but hold that we are animals 
nonetheless. 
Animalism has implications for our identity over 
time, how we’re still us through the past, present, and 
future, despite the many ways we change. If we’re 
human animals, then we can’t exist independently of 
those animals; what’s often called personal 
identity depends on our being the same animal over 
time—it’s a matter of biology.[3] 
2. Animalism vs. Psychological Theories 
Animalism departs from views according to which 
our identity over time is a matter of our psychology, 
on being psychologically connected to our past and 
future selves through our thoughts, memories, and 
self-conceptions:[4] e.g., if you remember not liking 
broccoli as a kid but like broccoli now, you’re still the 
same person because you remember being that kid. 
To see how animalism and psychological theories 
diverge, imagine this: 
You are diagnosed with an untreatable illness. 
Your doctor proposes a cutting-edge 
procedure to transplant your brain into 
another body, and your body will be kept 
alive long enough to salvage any remaining 
healthy organs for other patients awaiting 
transplants. After the procedure, the patient 
with your brain wakes up and thinks, 
“Amazing! I have a new body and no illness!” 
Where are you: with your brain or with your body?[5] 
According to psychological theories, the patient with 
your brain, who is psychologically connected to your 
earlier self, who remembers being you, is you. 
According to animalism, this patient is not you: 
identity is a matter of biology, not psychology. You are 
the animal with the illness but no brain, since this 
biological organism continues to live the same 
biological life that you were living before. Your brain 
is joined up with a different animal living 
a different biological life. 
Animalism entails that even a human animal on life 
support with no possibility of conscious activity is 
still one of us. And we can’t outlive these animals in 
an afterlife or—if technology ever enables this—by 
uploading our consciousnesses to a virtual 
reality,[6] or getting new bodies through brain 
transplants.[7] So animalism denies some common 
views about our identity through time. 
3. The Case for Animalism 
Why do some people accept animalism? The best case 
for it is the Thinking Animal Argument, directed at a 
seated reader: 
Premise 1: There is a human animal sitting in 
your chair. 
Premise 2: The human animal sitting in your 
chair is thinking. 
Premise 3: You are the only thinking being 
sitting in your chair. 
Conclusion: Therefore, you are the human 
animal sitting in your chair.[8] 
The being in your chair is a biological organism, a 
human animal; this living human organism with 
(right now) a functional brain, is thinking;[9] you are 
the only thinker there, no other thinking being is also 




If successful, the argument establishes that 
you are that human animal. It’s not that you and the 
animal occupy the same space, thinking the same 
thoughts. There’s just one thinker there, you, which 
establishes identity between you and the animal. 
Therefore, you are a human animal. And, if so, your 
identity depends on being the same human animal 
over time. 
4. Resisting Animalism 
Rejecting the argument requires denying a premise. 
Denying premise 1—that there is a human animal 
sitting in your chair—is hard to defend.[11] 
Denying premise 2—that the human animal sitting in 
your chair is thinking—requires claiming that the 
human animal isn’t thinking: the organism is not 
what literally thinks, but it is intimately related to 
a mind or a soul that does think. But if human animals 
don’t think, then either other intelligent organisms 
like dolphins or chimpanzees are not actually 
intelligent, or they, too, are intimately related to 
minds that think.[12] 
If we are thinking minds, not thinking animals, this 
might challenge some of our everyday judgments 
about ourselves and our relationship to physical 
things: e.g., you never actually see yourself in the 
mirror (you see the organism); if you take a road trip 
with your dog, Spot, where we normally judge there 
to be two things are actually four (the human animal, 
the canine animal, you, and Spot);[13] and you and 
Spot never snuggle (only the organisms do). 
Denying premise 3—that you are the only thinking 
being sitting in your chair—instead requires claiming 
that you are not the only thinker: you’re a thinker, 
and so is the human animal, with thoughts exactly 
like yours. But if there are two thinkers in your chair, 
you won’t know that you’re not the animal. Even if 
you think, “I’m not the animal; I’m the thinker 
that’s not the animal,” the animal will think the exact 
same thing. So, denying premise 3 doesn’t provide 
any assurance that you’re not an animal.[14] 
Another way to resist is with a parallel 
Thinking Brain Argument about the brain located 
where you are.[15] The argument has analogous 
support, but its conclusion contradicts animalism: 
you are a brain not an animal. So we might have 
equally good evidence for a competing conclusion. At 
the least, it warrants more discussion of what it takes 
to be a thinker. 
5. Conclusion 
So, what are we, fundamentally? Animals? Brains? 
Minds? Souls? Some combination? 
Any answer has consequences for our self-
understanding and raises further philosophical 
questions: When do we come into, and go out of, 
existence? Who counts as one of us, and what moral 
obligations do we have toward them? There’s a lot at 
stake when considering “What are we?” 
Notes 
[1] Descartes (1641) argues that each of us is an 
immaterial thing, a soul or a mind, rather than a 
physical thing, like a body. For an overview of his 
argument, see Meditation 6: The Existence of Physical 
Things and Substance Dualism in Descartes’ 
Meditations 4-6 by Marc Bobro. 
[2] Olson (1999) is a major proponent of animalism. 
For additional presentations of animalism and its 
various forms, see Bailey (2015), Thornton (2016), 
and Blatti (2019). 
[3] For an explanation of biological identity, 
continuing to live the same biological life, see Blatti 
(2019, §1.2); for an opposing view, see Madden 
(2016). The relationship between animalism and our 
identity over time is a matter of current debate; see 
Duncan (forthcoming) and Bailey, Thornton, and van 
Elswyk (forthcoming). 
[4] Locke (1690, II.xxvii) argues that personal identity 
is a matter of psychology. For an introduction to 
psychological theories of personal identity, see 
section 3 of Personal Identity by Chad Vance. 
[5] Another option is that neither patient is you, even if 
the procedure is successful. But, at most, you either 
follow your brain or stay with your body. Perhaps 
both patients survive as individuals very closely 
related, but not identical to, you. For discussions 
of survival as opposed to identity, see Parfit (1984). 
[6] For fictional representations of what this might be 
like, see Amazon’s Upload series or Black 
Mirror’s “San Junipero.” 
[7] The general challenge of the afterlife is that if you 
gain a new body or exist unembodied after physical 
death, you don’t appear to be the same animal. Some 
animalists, such as van Inwagen, try to preserve the 
possibility of an afterlife by arguing that God 
transports the human organism into a physical 
afterlife and puts a corpse in its place on earth; see 
discussion in Hasker and Taliferro (2019). Other 




the possibility of an afterlife, see, for example, 
Thornton (2019). 
[8] This is a reconstruction of Olson’s argument 
(2003). For other arguments for animalism, see Blatti 
(2012) and Bailey (2016). 
[9] If, later, this human animal has its brain removed 
for a brain transplant, then this human animal would 
no longer be thinking. But premise 2 is about what’s 
happening right now. 
[10] Philosophers of personal identity will go to great 
lengths to preserve the idea behind this premise; 
theories of personal identity should not lead to the 
conclusion that there are multiple thinkers where 
you are. For discussion, see Hershenov (2013). 
[11] Some philosophers would deny premise 1 and 
endorse mereological nihilism, according to which 
there are no composite physical objects, such as 
animals (or chairs, for that matter). For discussion of 
this view, see Wasserman (2017, §4). 
[12] Chimpanzees and dolphins, like humans, 
communicate, develop social relationships, use tools, 
work together cooperatively, and recognize 
themselves in the mirror, all of which provide 
evidence of thought and intelligence (Bearzi and 
Stanford 2010). 
[13] If we were to give an inventory of everything in 
the car, we’d typically mention things like luggage, 
Spot’s toys, road trip snacks, water bottle, etc., you, 
and Spot. But, once we’ve accounted for you and Spot, 
we would likely fail to account for two things that are 
very obviously in the car: the human animal and the 
canine animal. 
[14] Denying premise 3 also requires denying some 
everyday judgments: there would be twice as 
many thinkers as we normally recognize; the person 
and the animal are both thinking. If you do something 
nice for a friend, you’ve brought happiness to both 
your friend and the animal located where your friend 
is. If you say something that hurts their feelings, 
you’ve actually done it twice over: once to the person 
and once to the animal. 
[15] The Thinking Brain Argument proceeds as 
follows: 
Premise 1′: There is a human brain located where 
you are. 
Premise 2′: The human brain located where you are 
is thinking. 
Premise 3′: You are the only thinking being located 
where you are. 
Conclusion’: Therefore, you are a human brain. 
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